No Member State is More Equal than Others by Lenaerts, Koen
No Member State is More Equal than
Others
Koen Lenaerts 2020-10-08T11:00:17
As its national anthem states, Germany is firmly committed to upholding the values
of respect for unity (Einigkeit), the law (Recht) and freedom (Freiheit). Those
values are not only shared and cherished by Germany but also by each and
every European State that has joined – and wishes to remain a member of – the
European Union (the ‘EU’).1)Judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and
Others, C#621/18, EU:C:2018:999, paras 62 and 63. They are pan-European values
that have been incorporated into the EU legal order and form part of our common
heritage.
Whilst respecting their cultural diversity, the EU seeks to unite the Member States
and their peoples in a common quest for peace, prosperity and justice. In so
doing, the EU seeks to establish a government not of men but of laws. Both the
Member States and the European institutions must respect the ‘rules of the game’
as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’),
since no one is above the law. Last but not least, by conferring on individuals directly
effective rights that protect a sphere of freedom against public or, as the case
may be, private interference, EU law puts individuals centre stage in European
integration. It is the ongoing and reciprocal commitment of Member States and their
peoples to upholding those values that makes European integration move forward.
Needless to say, neither unity, nor respect for the rule of law, nor freedom can be
secured without equality before the law. In the EU legal order, this is made crystal
clear by Article 4(2) TEU which states that ‘[t]he Union shall respect the equality
of Member States before the Treaties’.2)L.S. Rossi, ‘The Principle of Equality
Among Member States of the European Union’ in L.S. Rossi and F. Casolari (eds),
The Principle of Equality in EU Law (Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer, 2017), at 3-43.
That equality has admittedly two dimensions, namely the one expressed in Art.
4(2) TEU and which thus forms part of EU law itself, and another one in public
international law, resulting from the fact that the EU builds upon treaties concluded
by the Member States (see, on that distinction, C.D. Classen, ‘Die Gleichheit der
Mitgliedstaaten und ihre Ausformungen im Unionsrecht’, EuR, 2020/3, at 255-269).
The present essay focuses on the former only. That Treaty provision means, in
essence, that all provisions of EU law are to have the same meaning and to be
applied in the same fashion throughout the EU. That is so regardless of conflicting
provisions of national law.
In my view, three direct implications flow from the principle of ‘equality of the Member
States before the Treaties’. First, the uniform interpretation and application of EU law
are key for guaranteeing that equality. Second, the uniform interpretation of EU law
needs to be ensured by one court and one court only, i.e. the Court of Justice. Third
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and last, the principle of primacy underpins the uniform interpretation and application
of EU law. That law – as interpreted by the Court of Justice – is ‘the supreme law
of the land’3)Expression borrowed from Article VI, Clause 2, of the US Constitution.
as primacy (Anwendungsvorrang) guarantees that normative conflicts between EU
law and national law are resolved in the same fashion. Primacy thus guarantees that
both the Member States and their peoples are equal before the law.
Moreover, those three implications are deeply intertwined: one cannot exist without
the two others. Without uniformity, there is no equality of the Member States before
the law. Without the Court of Justice, there is no uniformity. Without primacy, there is
no uniformity and thus, no equality. It is only by the judicial enforcement of uniformity
and primacy of EU law that European citizens find equal justice under that law. Let
us now look somewhat more deeply into those three implications by exploring the
transnational dimension of primacy and the role that the Court of Justice plays in
guaranteeing the equality of the Member States before the Treaties.
I. The Transnational Dimension of Primacy
A number of national constitutional courts, as well as some scholars, have examined
the principle of primacy from a two-dimensional perspective, i.e. as a means
of solving a bilateral conflict between a national legal order and EU law.4)For
two notable exceptions, see F. Fabbrini, ‘After the OMT Case: The Supremacy
of EU Law as the Guarantee of the Equality of the Member States’ (2015) 16
German Law Journal 1003, and V. Perju, ‘Against Bidimensional Supremacy in EU
Constitutionalism’ (2020) 21 German Law Journal 1006. However, in developing
their case law or academic arguments, they do not take into account the adverse
effects that the persistence of such a conflict may bring about in the 26 other national
legal orders, that is, when the primacy of EU law is called into question.
By contrast, it is precisely the imperative need to avoid such ‘transnational’ adverse
effects that provides the principle of primacy with its normative foundation in the
EU legal order. It goes back to the seminal ruling of the Court of Justice in Costa v
ENEL, in which the principle of primacy was announced for the first time, well over
fifty years ago.
In that case, the Court of Justice set out three justifications for the primacy of EU
law.5)See, in this regard, I. Pernice, ‘Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of
European Law’ in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (Eds.), The Past and Future of
EU Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, at 47. First, it stressed the fact that EU law
is not ‘foreign law’ but that it is rather by its very nature and in its own right ‘the law
of the land’ in each Member State.6)See Judgment of 15 July 1964, Costa v ENEL,
6/64, EU:C:1964:66, at 593, where the Court of Justice held that ‘on the entry into
force of the Treaty, ‘[EU law] became an integral part of the legal systems of the
Member States’. It follows that EU law is our common law as Europeans. EU law
is German law as it is Greek, Slovenian, Dutch, Swedish, Spanish, French, Italian,
Polish law – and so on. EU law must prevail over conflicting provisions of national
law because it is the law that is common to all Member States. In order for EU law to
- 2 -
remain fully effective as the ‘common law’ of Europe, it must prevail over conflicting
provisions of national law. It follows that the primacy of EU law has a transnational
dimension that seeks to guarantee that all provisions of EU law are to have the same
meaning and to be applied in the same fashion throughout the EU.
Second, the Court of Justice grounded the principle of primacy in the twin ideas
of reciprocity and non-discrimination, which are both embedded in the principle of
equality of Member States before the Treaties. It did so by highlighting the tension
between reciprocal commitments and unilateral action. The primacy of EU law
guarantees that all Member States remain reciprocally committed to fulfilling the
obligations imposed by that law.7)In the key passage of the judgment of 15 July
1964, Costa v ENEL, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66, at 593-594, the Court of Justice ruled
that ‘[t]he integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive
from the [EU], and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it
impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity.
Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with that legal system’ (emphasis
added). It would be contrary to the logic underpinning the EU legal order for a
Member State to select unilaterally the commitments that it wished to fulfil, whilst
disregarding those that it did not. Primacy goes hand in hand with the principle of
equality of Member States before the law, since it rules out ‘cherry-picking’ that may
serve individual national interests. It thus means that all Member States in the EU
have no choice but to take the bitter with the sweet.
Third and last, the Court of Justice invoked two textual arguments. It noted that
‘[w]herever the Treaty grants the States the right to act unilaterally, it does this by
clear and precise provisions’. The Treaties rule out ‘implied opt-outs’. It also referred
to the nature of EU regulations as provided for by Article 288 TFEU, which are
‘binding’ and ‘directly applicable’ in all Member States.
‘That [Treaty] provision which is subject to no reservation’, the Court of
Justice wrote, ‘would be quite meaningless if a State could unilaterally
nullify its effects by means of a legislative measure which could prevail over
[EU] law’. (Costa v ENEL at 594)
In the light of the foregoing observations, the Court of Justice came to the conclusion
that ‘the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could
not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as [EU] law
and without the legal basis of the [EU] itself being called into question’.8)Judgment
of 15 July 1964, Costa v ENEL, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66, at 594. Some scholars have
drawn on this passage of the judgment in order to examine the principle of primacy
from a ‘Hamiltonian perspective’. See, e.g., J. Lindeboom, ‘Is the Primacy of EU
Law Based on the Equality of the Member States? A Comment on the CJEU’s
Press Release Following the PSPP Judgment’ (2020) 21 German Law Journal
1032. To that end, that author cites the following passage of the Federalist No.
33: ‘But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the supreme law of the land.
But what inference can be drawn from this, or what would they amount to, if they
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were not to be supreme? It is evident they would amount to nothing. A LAW,
by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those
to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This results from every political
association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must
be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter
into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the
powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those
societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would otherwise be
a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government,
which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY’. See
A. Hamilton, ‘Federalist No 33’ in A. Hamilton, J. Madison, and John Jay, The
Federalist Papers, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, at 157. In accordance
with such a perspective, primacy would not only be a means to ensuring the equality
of the Member States before the Treaties but most importantly an end in itself as it
defines the specific nature of EU law.
Over the last 50 years, the Court of Justice has consistently confirmed its findings in
Costa v ENEL. It has expressly stated that EU law may prevail over administrative
regulations, legislative statutes and even constitutional provisions that are
incompatible with EU law. As the Court of Justice ruled in Winner Wetten, ‘[r]ules of
national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the unity
and effectiveness of Union law’.9)Judgment of 8 September 2010, Winner Wetten,
C#409/06, EU:C:2010:503, para. 61 (referring to judgment of 17 December 1970,
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70, EU:C:1970:114, para. 3).
Notably, this means, building on the parallel judgments of the Court of Justice in
Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson, that where the EU legislator has fully harmonised
the level of protection of a fundamental right, the compatibility of a national measure
with such a right is to be examined in the light of EU law, and not according to
national standards. If such a measure is incompatible with EU law, that measure
is, by virtue of the principle of primacy, to be set aside. Conversely, where there is
no such harmonisation, national standards that are higher than those guaranteed
by the EU Charter may apply, provided that ‘the primacy, unity and effectiveness of
[EU] law are not thereby compromised’ (Åkerberg Fransson, at 29). It is worth noting
that the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) has endorsed and faithfully applied
that case law in the context of two recent orders concerning the so-called right to
be forgotten (Recht auf Vergessen I and Recht auf Vergessen II). In one of those
two parallel orders, it held that, when German authorities apply legal provisions that
are fully harmonised under EU law, the relevant standard of review does not derive
from German fundamental rights as provided for by the Basic law, but solely from EU
fundamental rights (Recht auf Vergessen II at 42). In those circumstances, by virtue
of the principle of primacy (Anwendungsvorrang), the Bundesverfassungsgericht will,
in close cooperation with the Court of Justice, directly examine whether the German
authorities have complied with EU fundamental rights.
To date, no Treaty provision has expressly recognised the principle of primacy.
There is no Supremacy Clause similar to that set out in Article VI of the US
Constitution.10)Article VI, Clause 2, of the US Constitution states that ‘[t]his
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Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding’. Arguably, the incorporation of such a clause
would be a positive development, as it would give more visibility to the principle
of primacy.11)That was perhaps the intention of the authors of the Draft Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Article I-6 thereof, entitled ‘Union law’, stated
that ‘The Constitution, and law adopted by the Union’s Institutions in exercising
competences conferred on it, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States’.
However, when it comes to the Member States’ commitment to respecting the
primacy of EU law, such incorporation is both irrelevant and redundant.
It is irrelevant because the primacy of EU law over national law ‘cannot rely on a
simple textual provision, but must be justified through a deeper argument’.12)F.
Fabbrini, above note 4, at 1019-1020. See also A. Hamilton, above n 10, at 157 (who
posited that the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution is declaratory in nature).
Moreover, the Member States have never sought to overrule, nuance or reform the
principle of primacy – as interpreted by the Court of Justice – by the adoption of
a Treaty amendment. Accordingly, the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ have consistently
endorsed the primacy of EU law as interpreted by the ‘Umpire of the Treaties’, i.e.
the Court of Justice.
This demonstrates that the Member States remain committed to respecting that
principle. That ongoing commitment finds concrete expression in Declaration 17
annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty of Lisbon. That declaration states that
‘[t]he Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case law
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law
adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the
law of Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case law’.
Most importantly, by codifying the principle of equality of Member States before
the Treaties in Article 4(2) TEU, the Treaty of Lisbon has given new impetus to
the principle of primacy as interpreted by the Court of Justice. Since there is an
unbreakable link between the equality of the Member States before the Treaties, the
uniform interpretation of EU law and the primacy of that law, it is now safe to say that
the principle of primacy has found its way into the Treaties. In effect, Article 4(2) TEU
is to be read as already containing a Primacy Clause. The incorporation of a Treaty
provision containing an additional Primacy Clause would thus be, to some extent,
redundant.
II.  The Role of the Court of Justice
As already said, in order for EU law to apply uniformly, one court – and one court
only – must have the final say as to what the law of the EU is. That is not something
new, nor unique to the EU legal order. It is a feature of legal systems that adhere
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to the rule of law within democratic societies across the world. Constitutional courts
have the final say as to what the Constitution means. In the same way, the highest
court within the judicial order of a Member State has the final say as to the meaning
of legislative texts. In multilevel systems of governance, the Federal Supreme Court
has the final say as to what federal law means, whilst State Supreme Courts provide
the definitive interpretation of State law.
The fact that at the end of the day, a court will have the final say regarding the
interpretation of the law clearly stems from the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States. All legal disputes must be resolved for good by a competent
court that has the final say about the applicable law. This ensures legal certainty. In
accordance with those constitutional traditions, the authors of the Treaties vested the
Court of Justice with the ultimate authority to say what the law of the EU is.
It is worth noting that, according to historians, the German delegation played a
‘hegemonic’ role in defining the Court of Justice as the supreme interpreter of EU
law. As Morten Rasmussen points out, when discussing the role that the Court of
Justice was to play in the future ECSC,
‘[the] head of [the German] delegation, Hallstein, supported by the delegate
from the Foreign Ministry, Ophüls, wanted to create a Federal Court
similar to the new German Bundesverfassungsgericht that would ensure
the development of a European Rechtsstaat. Over time they believe a
Federal Court would create a European consciousness and thus play a role
similar to the American Supreme Court. Therefore, the German delegation
insisted on the need to develop a uniform jurisprudence with the Court
holding exclusive rights to interpret the Treaty’.13)M. Rasmussen, ‘The
Origins of a Legal Revolution – The Early History of the European Court of
Justice’ (2008) 14 Journal of European Integration History 77, at 83-84.
Whilst it is true that the Court of Justice is not equivalent to the US Supreme Court
(nor does it intend to be), the views of the German delegation found support among
the other delegations which also insisted on the need to ensure the rule of law within
the EU by bestowing upon the Court of Justice the ultimate authority to interpret
the Treaties. Those views are crystallised in what is now Article 19 TEU. It states
that the Court of Justice ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the
Treaties the law is observed’. Ensuring that the law is observed entails the duty for
the Court of Justice to achieve the uniform interpretation of EU law. Such uniform
interpretation requires the Court of Justice to have the final say in this respect, and
even the only say when it comes to declaring provisions of that law invalid.
In the same way, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has consistently recognised and
respected the role that the Court of Justice is to play in the EU legal order. In
Solange II and the relevant cases thereafter, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that
‘Article [267 TFEU] accords the Court of Justice the conclusive authority
in relation to the courts of [Member] States to make decisions on the
interpretation of the Treaty and on the validity and interpretation of
instruments of [EU] law derived therefrom. That judicial monopoly for the
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European Court (embodied for the purposes of [EU] law in Article [267
TFEU]) as regards the sphere of competence allotted to it exclusively under
the Treaty gives it the character to that extent of a statutory court within the
meaning of Article 101(1), second sentence, of the [Basic Law]’.14)BVerfG,
order of 22 October 1986, Solange II, 2 BvR 197/83, para. 78. For the
English Translation, see [1987] 3 CMLR 225, 251.
Therefore, in the EU legal order, the Court of Justice is gesetzlicher
Richter.15)BVerfG, order of 22 October 1986, Solange II, 2 BvR 197/83, para. 75.
See, more recently, order of 14 May 2020, 2 BvR 993/15 and 2 BvR 858/16, para.
62.
III.  Concluding Remarks
The principle of primacy is not just a means of solving bilateral conflicts between
two legal orders, but is rather, first and foremost, a grounding principle securing that
all Member States – regardless of their size, policy views or economic power – are
treated equally before the law. Moreover, as the ‘Umpire of the Treaties’, the Court of
Justice has the final say as to what the law of the EU is. The Court of Justice – and
only the Court of Justice – may guarantee that a provision of EU law has the same
meaning throughout the EU.
If a Member State calls into question the primacy of EU law as interpreted by the
Court of Justice and engages in a unilateral course of action, it shows disrespect
towards the other Member States and their peoples that continue to honour the
Treaties on a reciprocal basis. Such a unilateral course of action also sends the
message that EU law does not apply with the same force throughout the EU and
that ‘some Member States are more equal than others’.16)Paraphrasing the famous
words written by G. Orwell in Animal Farm (Secker & Warburg, 1945). However,
there is no place for unilateralism in the EU, since it stands in the way of upholding
the values of respect for unity (Einigkeit), the law (Recht) and freedom (Freiheit) to
which we Europeans are all reciprocally committed.
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